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CIVIL RIGHTS--TITLE VI-THE EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES Is NOT A PREREQUISITE TO A PRIVATE RIGHT OF
ACTION UNDER TITLE VI
Chowdhugy v. Readng Hospital & Medical Center (1982)
A. Rab Chowdhury, M.D., brought suit' against the Reading Hospital
and Medical Center (Hospital)2 alleging that he had been denied courtesy
staff privileges because of his race. 3 Without seeking any administrative
remedy, Dr. Chowdhury sought injunctive relief in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI)4
which prohibits racial discrimination in any federally funded program. 5
The district court granted the Hospital's motion to dismiss 6 finding that
the plaintiff had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies provided for
in Title VI. 7 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit8 reversed and remanded, holding that a plaintiff need not exhaust
administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial relief in a private action
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Chowdhuy v. Reading Hospi'tal
& Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982), petition for cert. filed, 51
U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1982) (No. 82-201).
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) to deal with the
serious national problem created by the "injustices and humiliations of ra-
cial and other discrimination." 9 Title VI of the Act attempts to thwart dis-
crimination by prohibiting the exclusion, on the basis of race, of anyone
1. Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir.
1982),petition for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W. 3120 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1982) (No. 82-201). The
plaintiff is a physician licensed to practice medicine and surgery in Pennsylvania. Id.
at 318.
2. Id. The defendant, the Reading Hospital and Medical Center, is a non-profit
corporation receiving federal financial assistance from various government agencies.
Id.
3. Id at 319.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
5. 677 F.2d at 318-19. For the full text of § 601 of Title VI, see note 10 and
accompanying text tnfra. For a discussion of the purposes of Title VI, see note 11 and
accompanying text zhfra.
6. See Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Center, 520 F. Supp. 134, 135
(E.D. Pa. 1981), rev'd, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982),pez.Ion for cert. filed, 51 U.S.L.W.
3120 (U.S. Aug. 5, 1982) (No. 82-201).
7. Id The district court stated that Dr. Chowdhury could return to the court for
relief if the parties did not "amicably resolve their differences and other administra-
tive remedies proved ineffective." Id. For a discussion of the administrative remedies
available under Title VI, see notes 15-19 and accompanying text infra.
8. The case was heard by Judges Aldisert, Van Dusen and Garth. Judge Van
Dusen wrote the majority opinion and Judge Aldisert filed a dissenting opinion.
9. H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18, rep inted zn 1964 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2391, 2394. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000h-6.
(693)
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from "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."' 1 In
describing the specific objectives of Title VI,"' the United States Supreme
Court, in Cannon v. Uni'versi*y of Ch'cago, 12 explained that Congress enacted
this statute "to avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory
practices . . . [and] to provide individual citizens effective protection against
those practices." 1
3
The protection against racial discrimination afforded by Title VI may
be enforced by both administrative and judicial sanctions.14 When a viola-
tion of Title VI occurs,15 the statutory scheme provides that an agency may
10. Section 601 of Title VI provides that "No person in the United States shall,
on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activ-
ity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976).
11. During debates on the Civil Rights Act of 1964, one U.S. Senator described
the purpose of Title VI as follows:
The purpose of title VI is to make sure that funds of the United States are
not used to support racial discrimination. In many instances the practices
of segregation or discrimination, which title VI seeks to end, are unconstitu-
tional . . . . In all cases, such discrimination is contrary to national policy,
and to the moral sense of the Nation. Thus, title VI is simply designed to
insure that Federal funds are spent in accordance with the Constitution and
the moral sense of the Nation.
110 CONG. REc. 6544 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
For a further discussion of the purposes of Title VI, see Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-87 (1978) (Opinion of Powell, J.).
12. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). In Cannon, the plaintiff brought an action under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976),
against the medical school where she was allegedly denied admission because of her
sex. Id. at 680. Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in any education
program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. The Cannon Court recog-
nized that Title IX was patterned after Title VI by Congress and accordingly ad-
dressed a portion of their opinion to a consideration of the purposes of Title VI. Id.
at 684-85, 697-716. Courts have subsequently held that the language in Cannon is
applicable to actions under Title VI. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center,Inc., 599
F.2d 1247, 1257 (3d Cir. 1979) ("Title IX was expressly intended by Congress to
track the previously enacted Title VI . . . ."); Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of
Colo., 658 F.2d 1372, 1379 (10th Cir. 1981) ("[I]n Cannon . . . the Supreme Court
ruled that . . . Title IX of the Civil Rights Act was patterned after Title VI of that
Act .... ").
13. 441 U.S. at 704.
14. For a discussion of administrative sanctions, see notes 16-19 and accompany-
ing text infra. For a discussion of judicial remedies, see notes 20-25 and accompany-
ing text infra.
15. Title VI does not provide a remedy for all types of discriminatory practices
which occur in a federally funded program. For example, Title VI explicitly limits
its applicability with respect to individuals alleging employment discrimination. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). Section 604 of Title VI provides: "Nothing contained in
this subchapter shall be construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any
department or agency with respect to any employment practice of any employer,
employment agency, or labor organization except where a primary objective of the
Federal financial assistance is to provide employment." Id. Courts that have consid-
ered this issue have concluded that the scope of Title VI does not include protection
against employment discrimination unless the primary objective of the federal fund-
ing is to provide employment. See, e.g., Association Against Discrimination in Em-
2
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terminate federal funding 16 if the entity fails to voluntarily cease its discrimi-
natory practices. 17 This agency sanction is invoked pursuant to regulations
promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services which al-
low an aggrieved individual to file a written complaint with the funding
agency.' 8 Under the administrative scheme, the complainant has no role in
ployment v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 276 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1611 (1982). ("[Flor a claimant to recover under Title VI against an employer
for discriminatory employment practices, a threshold requirement is that the em-
ployer be the recipient of federal funds aimed primarily at providing employment.").
For other cases holding that in order to claim employment discrimination under Ti-
tle VI the primary objective of the federal financial assistance must be to provide
employment, see Jones v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 681 F.2d 1376,
1378 (1 1th Cir. 1982); Meiner v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 975 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 103 S. Ct. 215 (1982); Carmi v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist., 620 F.2d
672, 675 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 892 (1980); Trageser v. Libbie Rehabili-
tation Center, Inc., 590 F.2d 87, 88-89 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 947
(1979).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (1976). Section 602 of Title VI provides that "compli-
ance with any requirement adopted pursuant to" Title VI may be enforced by termi-
nating, refusing to grant, or continuing federal funding. These sanctions may only be
imposed after a hearing and are limited to the particular entity found to have vio-
lated the regulation. The effect of the sanction is to be limited to the particular
program in which the violation occurred. Id.
Under § 603 of Title VI, judicial review of agency or department action is per-
mitted. Id § 2000d-2.
17. Id § 2000d-l. Section 602 of Title VI limits the authority to impose sanc-
tions by providing that "no such action shall be taken until the department or agency
concerned has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be secured by vol-
untary means." Id
In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. t. Bakke, Justice White, in a separate opinion, stated
that "[t]ermination of funding was regarded by Congress as a serious enforcement
step, and the legislative history is replete with assurances that it would not occur until
every possibility for conciliation had been exhausted." 438 U.S. 265, 382 (1978)
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Senator Humphrey in his remarks in a Senate debate on the Civil Rights Act of
1964 said that the "[c]utoff of funds . . . should be the last step, not the first, in an
effective program to end racial discrimination." 110 CONG. REC. 6546 (1964) (re-
marks of Sen. Humphrey). See also id. at 1519 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler)
("[N]o action whatsoever can be taken against anyone until the Federal agency in-
volved has advised the appropriate person of his failure to comply with non-discrimi-
nation requirements and until voluntary efforts to secure compliance have failed");
id at 6749 (1964) (statement of Sen. Moss) ("[Elach component of this program
provides for the deferment of the use of a sanction until all other means-investiga-
tion, conciliation, negotiation, information hearings, and trial-have been ex-
hausted."); id at 7066-67 (1964) (statement of Sen. Ribicoff). (The withholding of
funds would be "a last resort, to be used only when other means authorized by law
were unavailable or ineffective.").
18. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.7(b) (1980). Section 80.7(b) provides:
Any person who believes himself or any specific class of individuals to be
subjected to discrimination prohibited by this part may by himself or by a
representative file with the responsible Department official or his designee a
written complaint. A complaint must be filed not later than 180 days from
the date of the alleged discrimination, unless the time for filing is extended
by the responsible Department official or his designee.
3
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the investigation or adjudication of the complaint. 19
While Title VI does not expressly provide for a private cause of ac-
tion,20 the Third Circuit and other courts have held that such a cause of
action is implicit in Title VI.2 1 For example, in NAACP v. Medical Center,
19. For the regulations governing the conduct of investigations and the proce-
dure for effecting compliance and for conducting hearings, see 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.7.(c)-
.9(d).
20. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 381 (1978) (White,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[T]here is no express provision for
private actions to enforce Title VI.").
The Supreme Court, in Cannon, held that a private cause of action was implied
under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. 441 U.S. at 688-709. In
reaching its holding, the Court recognized that Title IX was patterned after Title VI
and that the drafters of Title IX intended that it would be interpreted and enforced
in the same manner as Title VI which had been held by lower courts to create a
private remedy. Id at 709. Cannon thus recognized the assumption that there was a
private cause of action under Title VI. Cannon, however, was presumably decided on
the basis of the four-part test of Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Under the Cori
analysis, a cause of action could be implied if 1) the plaintiff is a member of the class
"for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted," 2) the legislative history did not
evidence any legislative intent to negate the cause of action, 3) implying a remedy
would be consistent with legislative purpose, and 4) the nature of the case must be
such that a federal right of action would not intrude upon an area traditionally rele-
gated to state law. Id at 78. After Cannon, the Cort test was rejected in favor of a test
which focused solely on whether Congress intended to create a private cause of action.
See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979). However,
because of the history of implied causes of action under Title VI, of which Congress
had notice, Cannon is not necessarily inconsistent with Transamerica. The Supreme
Court has never decided whether a cause of action may be implied under Title VI.
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 283 (1978). Several lower
federal courts have held that a cause of action may be implied, but these decisions
were prior to Transamenca. See note 21 infra.
21. See, e.g., NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979). See
also Bossier Parish School Bd. v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388
U.S. 911 (1967) (private cause of action implied under Title VI for parents of black
children who were not permitted to attend integrated public schools). Other courts
have merely assumed a cause of action was available. See, e.g., Uzzell v. Friday, 547
F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1977) (court assumed a private cause of action existed in reverse
discrimination suit); Serna v. Portales Mun. Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974)
(court assumed a private cause of action existed to allow the parents of Spanish-
surnamed children to maintain an action for discrimination). For a comprehensive
list of cases recognizing an implied cause of action under Title VI, see Note, Ttle VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 Imply Private
Causes of Action, 25 VILL. L. REV. 1021, 1027-30 (1980).
In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, Justice Powell, writing for the plurality,
noted that, while the question of whether a private cause of action existed under
Title VI was not raised in the lower court, "[W]e assume, only for the purposes of this
case, that respondent has a right of action under Title VI." 438 U.S. 265, 283-84
(1978) (plurality opinion). Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion, maintained that
"the courts, including this Court, have unanimously concluded or assumed that a
private action may be maintained under Title VI." Id at 419 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
[Vol. 28: p. 693
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Inc. ,22 the plaintiffs were area residents2 3 who were served by the defendant
hospital and who sought to prevent the hospital from relocating its major
tertiary care components from the existing inter-city division to an outlying
suburban location. 24 The Third Circuit reasoned that because the plaintiffs
held a critical status as beneficiaries of Title VI, yet performed only a pe-
ripheral role in enforcement under the statute,25 Title VI should be con-
strued to create a private cause of action for intended beneficiaries who seek
a remedy other than funding termination.26 In so holding, the Medical Center
court noted that the administrative procedures and limitations set forth in
the enforcement sections of the statute were directed to agencies, and were
not limitations upon the rights of private parties.
27
Once it is determined that an individual may have a private cause of
action under Title VI, the next issue is whether that individual is required to
exhaust administrative remedies as a prerequisite to requesting judicial re-
lief.28 The customary rationales for requiring an aggrieved party to exhaust
22. 599 F.2d 1247, 1248-49 (3d Cir. 1979),notedin The Third Circuit Review, 25
VILL. L. REV. 1021 (1980).
The Third Circuit remanded this case to the district court. NAACP v. Wilming-
ton Medical Center, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290 (D. Del. 1980). The district court on
remand entered judgment for the defendant, on the ground that there was no show-
ing by the plaintiffs of discrimination violative of Title VI. Id at 345. The Third
Circuit subsequently affirmed, holding that while proof of disparate impact is suffi-
cient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VI, the NAACP plaintiffs had failed
to carry their burden of proof. NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d
Cir. 1981), noted in The Third Circuit Review, 27 VILL. L. REV. 797 (1982).
23. 599 F.2d at 1248. The Medical Center court found that the area residents who
brought suit were the intended beneficiaries of the federal funding to the Medical
Center and hence Title VI was designed to ensure that they were not discriminated
against. Id at 1252. The Medical Center court applied the test of Cort V. Ash, for
implying a private cause of action, the first step of which requires that the plaintiff be
"one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted." See Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (emphasis in original). For a discussion of the Cort test, see
note 20 supra.
24. 599 F.2d at 1248-49.
25. Id at 1254-55. The Medical Center court found a private right of action to be
"entirely consistent with the legislative scheme." Id
26. Id at 1259. The court specifically held that a private cause of action exists
for a plaintiff seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. d For a further discussion
of the Medical Center decision, see Comment, Civil Rights: Title VI-Is a Private Action
Intended? 19 WASHBURN L.J. 565 (1980); Note, supra note 20. Although Medical Center
was decided prior to the new test for implying a private cause of action employed in
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11 (1979), the court emphasized
legislative intent and it has been suggested that the decision is not inconsistent with
the more recent Supreme Court decisions. See Note, supra note 20, at 1034.
27. 599 F.2d at 1255. For a discussion of the administrative enforcement sec-
tions of Title VI, see notes 15-19 supra.
28. The exhaustion requirement is a widely accepted doctrine applied in situa-
tions where specific administrative remedies are made available to an aggrieved indi-
vidual. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938). Under the
exhaustion doctrine a person is "[not] entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or
threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted."
Id at 50-51. For a general discussion of the exhaustion doctrine, see B. SCHWARTZ,
1982-83]
5
Warter: Civil Rights - Title VI - The Exhaustion of Administrative Remedi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1983
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
administrative remedies include the goal of avoiding "unnecessary judicial
intervention" 29 in the administrative process and the conviction that a court
should defer to an agency's expertise in "perform[ing] functions within its
special competence-. . . mak[ing] a factual record, ... apply[ing] its ex-
pertise, and . . .correct[ing] its own errors.''30
The exhaustion doctrine is generally not applied when the plaintiff is
able to show that the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile
or counterproductive. 3 1 The courts have reasoned that when it is clear that
the relief sought cannot, or will not, be granted by the administrative
agency, it is counterproductive to require exhaustion. 3 2 Some courts have
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 172 (1976). For a discussion of a general exception to the
application of the exhaustion doctrine when the available remedies are counterpro-
ductive, see notes 31-32 and accompanying text infia.
29. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289, 1292 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). See also McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). In McKart, the
Supreme Court discussed the exhaustion doctrine:
Application of the doctrine to specific cases requires an understanding of its
purposes and of the particular administrative scheme involved . . . . A
primary purpose is, of course, the avoidance of premature interruption of
the administrative process . . . .And of course it is generally more efficient
for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is
to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate
stages . . . .This reason is particularly pertinent where the function of the
agency and the particular decision sought to be reviewed involve exercise of
discretionary powers granted the agency by Congress, or require applica-
tion of special expertise . . . . In addition . . .[c]ertain very practical no-
tions of judicial efficiency come into play as well . . . . And notions of
administrative autonomy require that the agency be given a chance to dis-
cover and correct .its own errors. Finally, it is possible that frequent and
deliberate flouting of administrative processes could weaken the effective-
ness of an agency by encouraging people to ignore its procedure.
Id at 193-95.
30. Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37 (1972) (citing McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185, 194 (1969)).
31. See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. 14, 20-21 (E.D. N.Y. 1978) ("The administra-
tive procedures under Title VI provide no effective remedy to the plaintiffs. To re-
quire exhaustion of administrative remedies would be futile and
counterproductive."). For a further discussion of the Rios decision, see notes 33-36
and accompanying text infra. See also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Acree,
475 F.2d 1289, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (exhaustion of administrative remedies will be
excused when it is a mere "exercise in futility").
It is also possible for a court to conclude that an available administrative remedy
is inadequate because of undue agency delay. See, e.g., Adams v. Richardson, 351 F.
Supp. 636, 641 (D.D.C. 1972). The court in Adams applied this exception to Title VI
cases: "The underlying thrust of [Title VI] requires that the agency involved ...
attempt at the outset to secure compliance by voluntary means . . . . Where a sub-
stantial period of time has elapsed, during which ...attempts toward voluntary
compliance have been either not attempted or have been unsuccessful or have been
rejected" the plaintiffs action may not be dismissed on exhaustion grounds. Id
32. See, e.g., American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289, 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1973). In Acree, suit was brought under 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970) which
prescribes the procedure by which members of the competitive civil service may be
removed from their positions or suspended without pay. Id. at 1290. The court held
that the exhaustion of administrative remedies would be excused when it is a "mere
[Vol. 28: p. 693
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applied this futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine in Title VI actions.
For example, in Rios v. Read33 Puerto Rican parents brought suit under Title
VI against a school board for failure to provide adequate instruction for
their Spanish-speaking children. 34 The District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York noted that if plaintiffs were required to exhaust their ad-
ministrative remedies, the resulting sanction could be a complete
termination of funds to the bilingual program that the plaintiffs were con-
tending was inadequate. 35 The court concluded that the exhaustion doc-
trine was not appropriate where the plaintiffs had shown that "following the
administrative procedures would frustrate the very purpose of the plaintiff's
suit. "36
However, the Fourth Circuit, in Taylor v. Cohen, a 7 dismissed an action
brought under Title VI to restrain a school board from adopting a desegre-
gation plan because it concluded that judicial intervention was premature. 38
The court reasoned that until an administrative decision to terminate or
continue financial assistance was made, judicial intervention was not sanc-
tioned by the statute.
39
The district courts in the Third Circuit that have addressed the issue
have concluded that an exhaustion requirement is implicit in Title VI.40 For
example, the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, in John-
exercise in futility." Id at 1292. The court reasoned that the Civil Service Commis-
sion's regulations included so limited a scope of review that it was "clear beyond
doubt" that the agency would not grant the relief requested. Id.
33. 480 F. Supp. 14 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
34. Id at 16-17.
35. Id at 20.
36. Id at 21. The Rios court specifically noted the paradox created when the
administrative remedy of cutting federal funding results in the complete abolishment
of the specific program in which the aggrieved individual was denied participation
because of discrimination. Id. at 20.
37. 405 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1968). The school board had instituted a new deseg-
regation plan after the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) had
commenced administrative proceedings for the termination of federal funds to the
school board. A class action was brought by parents of area students alleging that
HEW had wrongfully coerced the school board to adopt a new desegregation plan by
threatening to terminate federal financial assistance. Id. at 278-79.
38. Id at 278.
39. Id. at 280. The court concluded that because Title VI afforded agency re-
view, review under the Administrative Procedure Act was not available. Id. at 279-
80. The court further reasoned that there was no equitable basis for enjoining
HEW's conduct prior to the conclusion of the administrative hearing. Id at 280.
40. See, e.g., Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Center, 520 F. Supp. 134,
135 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The enforcement policies implicit in Title VI require that
plaintiff exhaust administrative remedies prior to instituting suit .... "); NAACP v.
Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919, 924 (D. Del. 1977), rev'd, 599
F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979) ("As a general matter, the failure to seek administrative
redress of Title VI . ..grievances would require dismissal of a suit brought under
Title VI. . .in a federal court."); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F. Supp. 136,
158 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("Although no exhaustion requirement arises directly from
§ 2000d-2, we find that exhaustion may be implied as a prerequisite to any action
pursuant to 2000d el seq. "); Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D.
1982-83] 699
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son v. County of Chester,4 ' reasoned that "[t]he scheme of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is essentially administrative ' 42 and noted that the effectiveness of an
agency could be diminished if the courts encouraged people to ignore the
agency's procedures.4 3 In Santiago v. City of Philadelphia,4 4 it was held that,
given the enforcement policies implicit in Title VI, an exhaustion require-
ment was a prerequisite to any Title VI action. 45  Similarly, the district
court in Chowdhury v. Reading Hospit'al & Medical Center,46 citing the holdings
of each of the other district courts, granted the defendant's motion to dismiss
because the required administrative procedures had not been exhausted. 4 7
Nearly unanimous support for an exhaustion requirement in Title VI cases
can be found in the decisions of other federal district courts which have ad-
dressed the issue.
48
Pa. 1976) ("Because of the failure to exhaust the administrative procedures provided
by § 2000d-l, the Title VI claim must be dismissed.")
41. 413 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Pa. 1976). In Johnson, low income and minority
residents of the defendant county brought suit alleging that the county's use of fed-
eral funds granted to finance community development violated Title VI. Id at 1302.
The court dismissed the complaint because the plaintiffs had not exhausted their
administrative remedies. Id at 1311.
42. Id. at 1310. The court explained that "§ 2000d-1 requires the federal agen-
cies to effectuate the general proscriptions of § 2000d by promulgating appropriate
regulations consistent with the statute which provides federal assistance." Id For a
partial text of section 602 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1), see note 16 supra.
43. Id (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 183, 193-95 (1969)). For a
discussion of McKart, see note 29 supra.
44. 435 F. Supp. 136 (E.D. Pa. 1977). In SantIago, juvenile residents of a "Youth
Study Center" brought an action asserting, inter aha, that there was racial discrimina-
tion in the placement of juveniles at the federally funded detention center. Id. at
142-43.
45. id at 158. The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim because they had failed
to allege facts sufficient to justify any exception to the exhaustion requirement. Id
46. 520 F. Supp. at 135. For the facts of this case, see notes 1-5 and accompany-
ing text supra.
47. Id at 135. For a list of the other district courts which have required the
exhaustion of administrative remedies, see note 40 supra.
48. See, e.g., School Dist. of Saginaw v. United States Dept. of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 431 F. Supp. 147, 153 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (whether defendants complied
with Title VI is not a proper subject for the court to determine in absence of exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies); Hardy v. Leonard, 377 F. Supp. 831, 837-38 (N.D.
Cal. 1974) (plaintiffs in a Title VI employment discrimination suit complied with the
Title VI exhaustion requirement by seeking voluntary compliance through the fed-
eral funding agency); Feliciano v. Remney, 373 F. Supp. 656, 672-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(although the court found Title VI inapplicable because the allegedly discriminatory
program did not meet the § 2000d-3 "primary employment objective" requirement,
the court noted that the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust Title VI administrative remedies
also would have barred their claim); Dupree v. City of Chattanooga, 362 F. Supp.
1136, 1141 (E.D. Tenn. 1973) (defendant's motion to dismiss granted because plain-
tiffs failed to exhaust the administrative procedures provided in Titles I and VI, stat-
ing that "[t]he purpose of the exhaustion doctrine is to afford the agency an
opportunity to correct its own errors without judicial intervention."). But see Con-
cerned Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522, 527 (N.D. Ill.
1980). The district court in Concerned Tenants relied upon dicta in Cannon to conclude
that Title VI administrative procedures need not be exhausted. Id (quoting Cannon
[Vol. 28: p. 693
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While the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the exhaustion
of administrative remedies is required under Title VI, the Court, in Cannon v.
ni'ersit'y of Chicago,49 stated in dicta5 ° that they were "not persuaded that
individual suits [under Title IX] . . . [were] . . . inappropriate in advance
of exhaustion of administrative remedies."5 1 Because Title IX of the Educa-
tion Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), which prohibits sex discrimination in
education programs receiving federal funding,52 was modeled after Title
VI, 5 3 some courts have relied on the dicta in Cannon to conclude that exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies is not a prerequisite to a private action under
Title VI and similar statutes.
54
While the Third Circuit Court of Appeals had not explicitly addressed
the administrative exhaustion question prior to Chowdhury, in Medical
v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 708 n.4 1). For a discussion of the Cannon dicta,
see notes 49-54 and accompanying text infra.
49. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
50. Id at 680. Although the plaintiff in Cannon had initiated but not exhausted
the available administrative remedies, the sole question before the court was whether
an applicant excluded because of her sex from a federally funded education program
had a cause of action under Title IX. Id
51. Id at 706 n.41. The Court stated, "Because the individual complainants
cannot assure themselves that the administrative process will reach a decision of their
complaints within a reasonable time, it makes little sense to require exhaustion." Id
52. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
53. See 441 U.S. at 684-85, 697-716. See also note 12 supra.
54. See, e.g., Chowdhu.y v. Readng tIosp. & Medical Center, 677 F.2d at 321-22;
Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails Apartments, 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill.
1980).
Courts have also relied on the Cannon dicta to hold that the exhaustion require-
ment does not apply to actions brought pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
29 U.S.C. § 794 (Supp. III 1980). Section 504 of this Act prohibits discrimination
against the handicapped in federally funded programs. Id. The administrative pro-
cedures applicable to section 504 are identical to the procedures applied to com-
plaints under Title VI. See S. REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39-40, reprnted in
1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373, 6390. The legislative history of § 504
states that "[s]ection 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the anti-
discrimination language of section 601 of [Title VII the Civil Rights Act of 1964...
and section 901 of [Title IX] the Educational Amendments of 1972." Id
In Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981), the
plaintiff, an individual suffering from multiple sclerosis, was denied admission to a
federally funded psychiatric residency program solely by reason of his handicap, in
violation of § 504. Id at 1376. The Pushkin court, relying upon the Cannon dicta,
held that a plaintiff in a private cause of action under § 504, is not required to ex-
haust the administrative remedies before seeking judicial review. Id. at 1381. See also
Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated on other grounds
and remanded, 451 U.S. 390 (1981) (private suits for the enforcement of individual
actions are appropriate in § 504 cases, without exhaustion of administrative mecha-
nisms); Fells v. Brooks, 522 F. Supp. 30, 33 (D.D.C. 1981) (private right of action
exists under § 504, "and the existence of [this right] is not contingent upon the ex-
haustion of administrative remedies . . ."); Patton v. Dumpson, 498 F. Supp. 933,
940 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[It is well established that exhaustion is not required if the
only available administrative remedy is plainly inadequate.").
1982-83]
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Center,5 5 the court stated in dicta 56 that the exhaustion of administrative
remedies was not a prerequisite to a private cause of action under Title VI.
5 7
It was against this background that the Chowdhury court began its analy-
sis. Judge Van Dusen, writing for the court, initially reviewed the purposes
of Title VI 58 of avoiding "the use of federal resources to support discrimina-
tory practices" and providing individuals "effective protection against those
practices."' 59 He further observed that Congress had explicitly provided an
administrative enforcement mechanism in furtherance of the first of these
purposes.
6 0
The Chowdhugy court then examined its decision in Medical Center6 1 that
a private cause of action may be implied under Title VI, stating that it had
"specifically rejected the argument that the rights conferred by section 601
are dependent upon or limited by" Title VI's administrative remedies.
6 2
The Third Circuit noted that in Medical Center it had found the administra-
tive procedures set forth in sections 602 and 603 were designed to limit
agency action, not individual rights.6 3 Thus, the Third Circuit read the
Medical Center court's determination that a private cause of action was consis-
tent with the legislative scheme as rejecting the argument that not requiring
exhaustion would interfere with Title VI's administrative scheme.
64
55. 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979). For a further discussion of the Medical Center
decision, see notes 22-27 and accompanying text supra.
56. 599 F.2d at 1249-50. Administrative exhaustion was not an issue on appeal
because the district court had ordered HEW to treat the plaintiffs' complaint as in-
formation sufficient to initiate an investigation and compliance review. Id. at 1249
n.7.
57. Id. at 1249 n.6 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. at 1962).
More specifically the court said: "[W]e hold that there exists a private cause of action
under section 601 of Title VI which may be asserted without preliminary recourse to
agency remedial procedures. ... Id at 1250 n.10.
For a discussion of the applicability of Cannon to Title VI cases, see note 12supra.
58. 677 F.2d at 319. For a discussion of the purposes of Title VI, see note 11 and
accompanying text supra.
59. 677 F.2d at 319 (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 704;
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 284-87 (1978)).
60. Id. at 319-20. The administrative remedies the court identified were volun-
tary compliance and funding termination. d. The court noted that the administra-
tive scheme did not provide for participation by an aggrieved individual. Id. For a
further discussion of the administrative remedies available under Title VI, see notes
16-19 and accompanying text supra.
61. 677 F.2d at 320-21. For a discussion of the Medical Center decision, see notes
22-27 & 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
62. 677 F.2d at 320 (citing NAACP v. Medical Center, 599 F.2d at 1253-55).
The Chowdhuty court noted that the Medical Center decision was in part based upon
the fact that the legislative history of Title VI indicated there had been "substantial
disagreement over the propriety of using funding termination as an enforcement tool
because of its potential for abuse." Id
63. Id at 320-21 (citing NAACP v. Medical Center, 599 F.2d at 1254-55).
64. Id at 321. The court quoted Medtcal Center: "We find it impossible to
square the plaintiffs' peripheral role in the section 602 and 603 process with their
critical status as protected beneficiaries under section 601 ....... The Medical Center
court then found a right of action under § 601 "distinct from the limitations of sec-
[Vol. 28: p. 693
10
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol28/iss3/10
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
The Chowdhuy majority next turned to the Supreme Court's decision in
Cannon. While recognizing that the exhaustion doctrine was not before the
court, and hence any reference to it was dicta,65 the court read the language
of Cannon to be a "fairly clear indication from the Supreme Court" 66 in sup-
port of its holding.
6 7
The majority concluded that "the current state of the law does not re-
quire the exhaustion of the agency funding procedures and avenues of judi-
cial review contained in sections 602 and 603 as a prerequisite to a private
action for individual injunctive relief under section 601." 6 The majority
further noted that its holding would further judicial efficiency in that little
would be gained from compelling individuals to engage in administrative
procedures not designed to afford the relief desired.69
In a footnote, the court noted that the Medical Center holding reached
only intended beneficiaries of federally funded programs 70 and that it was
not clear whether Dr. Chowdhury stood in the position of an intended bene-
ficiary.7 1 While acknowledging that those circuits that had applied Title VI
to employment discrimination cases required proof that the funding's pri-
tions 602 and 603." Id (quoting NAACP v. Medical Center, 599 F.2d at 1254-55).
The Chowdhugy court found this reasoning to preclude the argument that the adminis-
trative scheme set forth in §§ 602 & 603 of Title VI would be interfered with if ex-
haustion were not required. Id
The Chowdhug court admitted that "it might be possible to narrowly distin-
guish" Chowdhuy from .Medical Center "on the ground that the exhaustion issue was
not before the [Aedical Center] court," however, the court felt that the prior treatment
of the issue, even though dicta, was sound. Id
65. Id
66. Id Noting that the Supreme Court in Cannon had treated Title IX as identi-
cal to Title VI, the Chowdhug court quoted Cannon at length, to the effect that ex-
haustion is not required and specifically that "[b]ecause the individual complainants
cannot assure themselves that the administrative process will reach a decision on
their complaints within a reasonable time, it makes little sense to require exhaus-
tion." Id (quoting Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. at 706-08 n. 41).
67. Id. at 322. The Third Circuit found that the Cannon dicta reinforced its
"conclusion that the current state of the law does not require [exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies]." Id The Chowdhugv court also relied upon recent decisions holding
that exhaustion is not required under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. Id
(citing Pushkin v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 658 F.2d 1372 (10th Cir. 1981);
Camenisch v. University of Tex., 616 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1980), vacatedon other grounds
and remanded, 451 U.S. 390 (1981). For a discussion of the exhaustion requirement
under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, see note 54 supra.
68. Id at 322.
69. Id at 323 n.16. The court took notice of the fact that the agency responsible
for enforcement of Title VI administrative provisions has often claimed that it lacks
the appropriate power and resources to remedy Title VI claims. Id (citations omit-
ted). The court, however, chose not to rely on the policy rationale for its decision,
stating that the issue was simply "whether Congress, in implying a cause of action,
also implied an exhaustion requirement." Id
70. Id at 320 n.9. For a further discussion of the "intended beneficiary" re-
quirement, see notes 15 & 23 supra.
71. 677 F.2d at 320 n.9.
1982-83]
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mary purpose was to provide employment, 72 the Chowdhury court assumed,
for the purposes of the appeal, that Dr. Chowdhury could assert a private
cause of action for denial of courtesy staff privileges. 73 The court instructed
the district court to decide whether Dr. Chowdhury was an intended benefi-
ciary upon a more complete development of the record.7 4
Judge Aldisert, in dissent, disagreed that the case was controlled by the
dictum found in Medical Center or Cannon. 75 After an extensive discussion of
the limitations of dictum, 76 Judge Aldisert suggested that the court must
avoid treating dictum with the weight of precedent. 77
Judge Aldisert further concluded that Chowdhuy was not controlled by
Cannon because, unlike the plaintiff in Cannon, Dr. Chowdhury had not
proven that he was an intended beneficiary under Title VI.78 The dissent
would extend the holdings of the courts that had concluded that private
causes of action under Title VI were barred in employment discrimination
cases 79 to the denial of courtesy staff privileges "when, as in this case, the
plaintiff has not alleged that providing staff privileges is relevant to the ob-
jective of the funding, let alone whether it is the primary objective of the
federal assistance." 80
Judge Aldisert further asserted that he could not accept that Congress
intended that a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination could deliher-
72. Id (citations omitted). For a discussion of the limitations of Title VI in
employment discrimination cases, see notes 15 & 23 supra.
73. 677 F.2d at 320 n.9.
74. d
75. Id. at 323 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). For the pertinent dicta in Medical Center
and Cannon upon which the majority relied and Judge Aldisert criticized, see notes
50-56 and accompanying text supra.
76. 677 F.2d at 323 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Judge Aldisert
defined the statements relied on by the majority as "classic obiter dictum: 'statement[s]
of law in the opinion which could not logically be a major premise of the selected
facts of the decision.'" Id (quoting R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAw 80 (2d
ed. 1968)). Judge Aldisert went on to note that while dictum "indicates the frame-
work of the opinion writer's thought," it does not have the strength of the actual
decision. Id. at 324 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Because "[t]he common law tradition is
one that depends for its stability on the gradual case-by-case method of developing
rules and from the rules, broader legal precepts," Judge Aldisert concluded that the
majority was incorrect in relying on Cannon or Medical Center. Id
77. Id ("Dictum is the antithesis of precedent.").
78. Id. at 324-25 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert distinguished Cannon
by noting that the plaintiff was a medical school applicant alleging that she was
denied acceptance because of her sex and that she premised her suit on Title IX
which explicitly deals with admissions to graduate programs receiving federal fund-
ing. Id at 325 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
79. Id at 326 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). Judge Aldisert noted that as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress had expressly provided that Title VI was not to be
construed as authorizing administrative action with respect to employment practices
"except where the primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to provide
employment." Id See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976). For the cases barring employ-
ment discrimination actions under Title VI for this reason, see note 15 supra.
80. 677 F.2d at 326 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
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ately bypass available administrative remedies under Title V18 ' but be re-
quired, under the same facts, to exhaust those procedures under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.82 Rejecting the majority's position that the
administrative remedies did not provide the plaintiff with a meaningful rem-
edy because he was not entitled to participate in the procedures, Judge Al-
disert reasoned that the informal resolution that was possible provided
sufficient protection.8 3 He concluded that Title VI must be construed con-
sistently with Title VII and that exhaustion of administrative remedies
should be required.8 4 Finally, he criticized the decision as unnecessarily
opening the doors to premature and needless litigation. 85
In evaluating the Chowdhuy decision it is submitted that the Third Cir-
cuit's holding was consistent with the Medical Center and Cannon rationales
which found a private cause of action under Titles VI and IX, respectively. 86
As the Supreme Court noted in Cannon, one of the objectives of Title VI is
"to provide individual citizens effective protection against [discriminatory]
practices."' 7 Given this objective, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress
intended appropriate remedies to be available to the individual without the
unnecessary delay caused by exhausting inappropriate administrative
remedies. 88
81. Id. The dissent found that Congress had evidenced a clear intent to favor
administrative conciliation where discrimination in employment relationships is
claimed. d (citations omitted).
82. Id The dissent noted that the administrative procedures were essential com-
ponents of Title VII. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits discrimina-
tion in employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) (Title VII).
The majority rebutted this argument, stating that the exhaustion requirement is
explicit in Title VII and that under Title VII, unlike Title VI, the administrative
powers are entirely suitable for resolving individual claims of discrimination. 677
F.2d at 322 n.13.
83. 677 F.2d at 326 (Aldisert, J., dissenting). The dissent found the emphasis of
the administrative regulations of both Title VI and Title VII to be on "informal
resolution of disputes, with adversarial procedures regarded as a last resort." Id
84. Id
85. Id at 326-27 (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
86. For a discussion of the availability of a private cause of action under Title
VI, see notes 20-21 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Cannon, see
notes 12, 20 & 49-54 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of Medcal Center,
see notes 22-27 & 55-57 and accompanying text supra.
87. 441 U.S. at 704. For a discussion of the applicability of Cannon to Title VI
questions, see note 12 supra.
88. It is not entirely clear that the Congress in 1964 envisioned that individual
citizens could invoke the protection of Title VI. The legislative history indicates that
Congress' concern was to ensure "that Federal funds [were] spent in accordance with
the Constitution." 110 CONG. REC. 6544 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey). For
a more complete text of Senator Humphrey's statement, see note 11 supra.
However, in 1974, the legislative history of the Rehabilitation Act indicates that
Congress believed that Title VI included a private right of action. See S. REP. No.
1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 40, repritted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6373,
6391. This report, while noting the similarities between Title VI and the Rehabilita-
tion Act, stated that the Act would "ensure administrative due process (right to hear-
ing, right to review), provide for administrative consistency within the federal
1982-83]
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The remedies explicitly provided in Title V189 and by the Department
of Health and Human Services9° regulations are necessarily inadequate for
an individual who has been discriminated against in a federally funded pro-
gram. 9 ' The termination of federal funding will not insure that the ag-
grieved individual will not be discriminated against and may in fact result in
the termination of the very program in which the individual sought partici-
pation.92 It would be counter-productive to require an individual to exhaust
administrative procedures, when he has no role in the investigation, 93 and
the relief specified in the statute is not appropriate. 94
Because the administrative remedies available to Dr. Chowdhury would
have been counter-productive, the court could have reached the same result
under the futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine.95 However, it is sub-
mitted that the court was justified in defining a clear rule based on congres-
sional intent to be applied in all private actions under Title VI because the
futility exception has not been applied uniformly.96 In fact each of the dis-
government as well as relative ease of implementation, and permit a judicial remedy
through a private action." Id (emphasis added).
Finally, it is clear that in 1979 the Supreme Court, in Cannon, stated that Con-
gress envisioned Title VI as providing a private right of action. 441 U.S. at 704. For
a discussion of the existence of private right of action under Title VI, see notes 20-27
and accompanying text supra.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). For a partial text of § 602, see notes 16-17 supra.
90. 45 C.F.R. § 80 (1980). Section 80.9 of the regulations provides that Federal
financial assistance may be refused if an applicant does not comply or offer assur-
ances of compliance with Title VI. Id
91. For a discussion of the limitations of the available administrative remedies,
see notes 16-19 & 31-36 and accompanying text supra.
92. See 677 F.2d at 322 n.13. Dr. Chowdhury was specifically interested in ob-
taining courtesy staff privileges at the defendant hospital. Id The termination of
federal funding to the hospital would penalize the hospital, but would provide no
relief for Dr. Chowdhury. Id Accord Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. at 20.. See notes 33-
36 and accompanying text supra.
It should be noted that § 602 explicitly states that voluntary compliance must be
attempted before federal funding is termirated. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-I (1976); See note
17 supra. However, it is suggested that the fact that a voluntary compliance proce-
dure is required is not sufficient relief for a private individual. It is unlikely that the
federal funding to the hospital will be cut off if a voluntary solution is not found.
93. See 45 C.F.R. § 80.7-80.9 (1980).
94. For a discussion of the limitations of the available administrative remedies
under Title VI, see notes 15-19 & 31-36 and accompanying text supra.
95. For a discussion of the exception to the exhaustion doctrine when adminis-
trative exhaustion would be counterproductive or futile, see notes 31-36 and accom-
panying text supra.
It is interesting to note that the futility exception to the exhaustion doctrine was
relied on exclusively, with no reference to Cannon or Medical Center, by Dr. Chowdhu-
ry on his appeal from the District Court. Brief for Appellant at 3-7, Chowdhury v.
Reading Hosp. & Medical Center, 677 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1982).
96. See Rios v. Read, 480 F. Supp. at 20 (exhaustion doctrine does not bar a suit
brought under Title VI because administrative exhaustion would have been futile
and counterproductive). For a discussion of Rios, see notes 33-36 and accompanying
text supra.
On the other hand, as early as 1967, the Fifth Circuit allowed suit to be brought
[Vol. 28: p. 693
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trict courts in the Third Circuit has held that exhaustion was a prerequisite
to a Title VI action even though the administrative remedies were clearly
counter-productive.
9 7
The value of the Chowdhuo, holding is that it specifically addresses and
decides the exhaustion issue98 and that it exemplifies the trend of broaden-
ing the plaintiffs access to the courts under Title VI.99 By promulgating a
per se rule the Third Circuit has made it clear that exhaustion will not be
required even in those factual situations where administrative remedies
would not necessarily be futile or counterproductive.
Carolyn j. Warier
without administrative exhaustion. See Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 380
F.2d 847, 852 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 911 (1967). Without making any refer-
ence to the exhaustion doctrine or its exceptions, the court said,
Section 601 states a reasonable condition that the United States may attach
to any grant of financial assistance and may enforce by refusal or with-
drawal of federal assistance. But it also states the law as laid down in hun-
dreds of decisions, independent of the statute. In this sense, the section is a
prohibition, not an admonition. In the absence of a procedure through
which the individuals protected by section 601's prohibition may assert
their rights under it, violations of the law are recognizable by the courts.
Id (5th Cir. 1967).
97. See Chowdhury v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Center, 520 F. Supp. 134, 135
(E.D. Pa. 1981); NAACP v. Wilmington Medical Center, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 919, 924
(D. Del. 1977),rev'dinhpart, 599 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1979); Santiago v. City of Philadel-
phia, 435 F. Supp. 136, 158 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F.
Supp. 1299, 1310-11 (E.D. Pa. 1976). For a discussion of these district court cases, see
notes 41-47 and accompanying text supra.
98. See 677 F.2d at 321. It is perhaps unfortunate that the Third Circuit
promulgated this per se rule in a case where the position of the plaintiff as an in-
tended beneficiary was admittedly unclear. See id. at 320 n.9. For a discussion of the
limitation of Title VI to intended beneficiaries of the federal funding, see note 15 and
accompanying text supra.
99. It is interesting to note that, given the interdependent development of Title
VI and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, the next issue the courts may have to address
is whether an action under Title VI may be brought for damages as well as injunctive
relief. Cf Miener v. Missouri, 673 F.2d 969, 978-79 (8th Cir. 1982) (damages are
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